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Abstract 
Integrated assessment models can help quantifying the implications of international climate 
agreements and regional climate action. This paper reviews scenario results from model inter-
comparison projects to explore different possible outcomes of post 2020 climate negotiations, 
recently announced pledges and their relation to 2°C. We provide key information for all the major 
economies such as the year of emission peaking, the regional carbon budgets and emissions 
allowances. We highlight the distributional consequences of climate policies, and discuss the role of 
carbon markets for financing clean energy investments, and achieving efficiency and equity.  
 
 
So far, international climate policy has been ineffective in curbing the rise of global greenhouse-gas 
emissions. Still, ambitious climate targets such as the 2°C target require a phase-out of global 
emissions by the end of the century, and an active participation of all world regions in climate policy1. 
Given the many obstacles to global cooperative action on climate change, the question remains how 
diverse national climate policies can be coordinated and strengthened globally. Within the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
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Action2 provides an important platform for a post-2020 international climate agreement. It contains 
several innovative elements, most notably a focus on the major economies that goes beyond the 
traditional divide between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. The Durban platform calls for a new 
climate treaty to be agreed in 2015 and implemented as early as 2020. The recently announced US-
China climate deal and the EU climate framework provide encouraging steps forwards, but aligning 
the incentives of the major emitters in pursuing stringent climate policies remains a challenge. In this 
paper, we aim at assessing the implications of post 2020 climate policies with specific reference to the 
major economies. We provide quantitative estimates of regional emission budgets, timing of emission 
peaking, and distribution of mitigation costs. We examine the role of carbon markets and different 
burden sharing schemes to alleviate distributional inequalities and finance the investment needs in 
low carbon mitigation technologies. In order to quantify these policy relevant variables, we resort to 
global models. 
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are tools designed to investigate the implications of achieving 
climate and other objectives in an integrated and rigorous framework. They are numerical models 
that account for major interactions among energy, land-use, economic and climate systems. Model 
differ in the economic, technological and sectoral representation and in the way they are solved, with 
some models maximizing an inter-temporal objective function (such as economic activity) and others 
simulating a set of equilibria (see the SOM for individual model description and references to 
documentation). Models generate global long-term scenarios for a number of regions or countries 
that can be used to inform climate and energy policies and to translate long-term climate objectives 
into potential medium-term courses of actions4–10. Scenarios from IAMs provide important input to 
scientific reviews such as the assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report. Given the 
focus of this review on climate mitigation policies, the models reviewed are employed to assess the 
implications of cost-effective policies to achieve a given climate goal  (like in the IPCC), rather than to 
determine the appropriate ambition of such a goal in a cost-benefit setting. In other words, the 
potential damages from climate change costs are not considered explicitly here, putting our analysis 
outside the controversial discussion regarding climate impacts and the social cost of carbon. 
 In order to generate conclusions that are robust to different models’ specifications, IAM teams have 
engaged in model inter-comparison projects (MIPs), in which a variety of models implement a 
common study protocol. Though cross-model comparison literature has developed fast, it has so far 
mostly reported on global issues7,11,12,45. Information from an MIP regarding the regional impacts of 
post 2020 climate policies is limited. This review aims at synthetizing insights from the most 
comprehensive MIP on this subject, the LIMITS project13,14,98. Though other MIPs have explored the 
role of fragmented regional mitigation effort and staged accession to climate cooperation (EMF2233, 
AMPERE34, EMF271), globally delayed participation (RECIPE35, ROSE36, AMPERE12), and burden-sharing 
schemes (RECIPE37), none except of LIMITS has focused on potential outcomes of the Durban platform 
negotiations, i.e. a period of fragmented moderate climate policy followed by global cooperative 
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action under different assumptions about burden sharing regimes. In addition, in LIMITS results are 
reported at a high regional resolution (for 10 regional aggregates which best match the native model 
regions), short term climate and energy policies are well detailed, the likelihood of achieving 2°C is 
relatively harmonized (using the MAGICC climate model) and a new burden sharing scheme is 
introduced and evaluated. Though we will use LIMITS as guiding example throughout the paper, the 
insights are framed by and compared with all the relevant literature on climate policy modeling3,15–20. 
 
  Box1 here 
 
Regional mitigation strategies 
One of the most valuable uses of integrated assessment models is in the translation of mitigation 
policies into climate outcomes, and conversely the translation of global climate objectives into  
regional commitments and timing of emission reductions. This allows the ‘when’ and ‘where’ 
questions that are key elements of climate policy considerations to be addressed.  
Figure 1 provides insights on the ‘when’ question, reporting the year of peaking of greenhouse gas 
emissions in 10 major economies for different policies (see Table S1 for a definition of the 10 regional 
aggregates). The emission peak year is an important indicator for policy, as it signals by when 
emissions should start to fall. Without explicit mitigation policies, models project emissions to 
increase until very late in the century in essentially all regions, though with significant model 
variation. This result is based on the expectation of continued economic growth and availability of 
fossil fuels. Mitigation pledges, based on the extrapolation the currently discussed targets38, would 
lead to differentiated peak years that depend on the stringency of the commitment and the growth of 
baseline emissions39. Industrialized economies are projected to keep emissions below current levels, 
but several developing country regions would see emissions rising until the second half of the century. 
Emissions in China would peak slightly later than 2030. It should be remarked that not all policy 
targets are included in the pledge scenario: for example, in the recently announced US-China deal, 
China pledged to meet 20% of energy demand with non-fossil sources by 2030. This target might 
exceed what accomplished in the LIMITS pledge scenarios (depending on the metric used), and if met 
could lead to further emission reductions and earlier peaking. 
In any case, a marked difference is observable when moving to climate stabilization targets around 
2°C. In order to minimize global costs, emissions would need to peak by the end of this decade in all 
major regions in order to have more than a 66% chance of limiting temperature increase to 2°C (i.e. 
450 ppm-eq). Relaxing the chances of meeting 2°C to 50% (i.e. 500 ppm-eq) would buy some time, i.e. 
on the order of 10-15 years for some developing countries. Reaching 2°C after following the pledges 
till 2030 would still be feasible but would come at a significantly higher cost13. 
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Figure 1 here 
A useful metric for quantifying climate change is that of cumulative emissions, or carbon budgets, 
which simply are the sum of emissions over time. These have been shown to be good, linear 
predictors of global temperature increase40–42. The emission scenarios from the integrated 
assessment models provide a split into regional budgets under the assumption of cost efficient 
implementation. Clearly, even under this assumption there is considerable uncertainty about the 
cost-effective regional split of emissions budgets as it depends on, inter alia, baseline emissions, 
regional mitigation potentials, differences in the global emissions reduction rate and terms of trade 
effects, all of which can vary substantially across models and regions14,33,43. 
Figure 2 provides estimates about regional cumulative emission budgets, as well as the historical 
contribution to emissions of the major economies. It indicates that in the No Policies scenario, 
unabated emissions of major emerging economies like China or regions such as the OECD would by 
themselves exhaust the entire global budget compatible with achieving 2°C. This would remain true 
even if countries committed to mitigation pledges, testifying to the crucial importance of a 
comprehensive climate agreement if the 2°C target is to be met. A limit of 2°C would require a 
significant reduction of carbon budgets in all major economies. No major economy would have a 
budget bigger than few hundred GtCO2, most of which to be used in the first half of century assuming 
carbon neutrality in later decades. When looking at all GHGs (Figure S3), budgets would increase for 
all regions, especially under the stringent climate scenarios, since non-CO2 gases are assumed to be 
harder to abate. 
Figure 2 here 
 
Figure 3 shows that cumulative emissions reductions relative to the No Policies scenario until 2050 
consistent with 2°C are quite similar across the major economies (percentage numbers right to the 
bars). Slightly larger relative emissions reductions would be necessary for developing regions such as 
Latin America, India, China and EIT. The contribution of these regions in terms of absolute GtCO2-eq 
emission reductions is even larger, given the higher projected baseline emissions in developing 
economies and in particular in Asia39.  
IAMs can also be used to further inform about ‘how’ the regional mitigation effort might be achieved. 
Figure 3 indicates that according to the LIMITS models the largest share of mitigation by sector would 
take place in the energy supply sector, confirming results from bottom-up and top-down studies,13,44–
47 48,49. In Latin America, Rest of Asia and Africa also the land-use sector plays a major role in 
abatement, due to the large potential for forest-based mitigation 51,52. These estimates vary widely 
across models, due to uncertainties about the effectiveness of land based mitigation measures. 
Middle East has the largest potential on the demand side. This is consistent with the currently high 
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energy intensity, in turn related to relatively low energy prices. Non-CO2 gases contribute to 10-20% 
in terms of abatement, and represent a significant share of residual emissions, since some emissions 
such as CH4 and N2O gases from agriculture are hard to mitigate
53. The overall picture is that, while 
energy supply has the highest mitigation potential, regional characteristics imply different patterns of 
mitigation across sectors54, which will also be influenced by the stringency of the climate target13,55. 
Figure 3 here 
 
Model variation is shown in Figures 1-3, and S1, S4 and S5. These figures show that the full cross-
model range of estimates can reflect significant spread, especially for some factors, such as land use 
mitigation potential, and in some regions, such as developing countries like Africa. Though the main 
results appear to be robust to such uncertainty, model variability should not be underestimated. A 
risk-management approach that explicitly reflects structural uncertainties can provide policy-makers 
with robust policy recommendations56, though it has not generally been adopted by IAM analyses so 
far57.  
One of the most contentious topics in international climate negotiations is the distribution of the 
mitigation effort. Combined with emission trading, different allocation methods can incorporate 
different views of fairness while still resulting in an (almost) cost-optimal implementation; in IAMs 
economic efficiency and equity are either assumed to be independent or found to be largely so, due 
to limited impact of income effects59. Despite this being a rough-and-ready approach that does not 
account for issues such as transaction costs, property rights, resource curse and institutional capacity, 
it nonetheless provides a convenient framework for thinking about the problem60. Many different 
allocation regimes have been proposed, mostly either based on the concepts of resource sharing 
(allocating the available emission space) or effort sharing (ensuring similar effort, such as equal 
costs)58. Many studies have assessed the implications of different regimes for the allocation of 
mitigation efforts19,58,61, finding that allocations are influenced by both the equity principle adopted 
and the overall climate objective.  
Figure 4 provides an example of how models project emissions allocations under different burden 
sharing schemes and the 2°C target as the climate objective. The actual emissions reductions that 
occur in cost-efficient scenarios assuming a globally harmonized carbon price (left) are contrasted 
with emissions allowances based on two burden sharing principles which aim to equalize per capita 
emissions allowances (by 2050) and regional mitigation costs respectively (these represent examples 
of a resource sharing and effort sharing regime, respectively). If a region receives an allowance above 
(below) its actual emissions, it would still mitigate the same net emissions –given the equity-efficiency 
independence discussed above- but would be able to sell (buy) emission rights equal to the difference 
between emissions and allowances. The case where emissions allowances exactly match domestic 
emissions reflects a situation where all mitigation efforts are financed domestically. Carbon markets 
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can then be used to redistribute wealth (in accordance to some given principle) while preserving 
economic efficiency.  
Figure 4 shows that for Europe and North America actual emissions and allowances in the per capita 
case would be similar and lower than the ones announced in the major economies forum meeting of 
2009 (80-95% reductions). A per capita burden-sharing scheme would require  a significant mitigation 
effort from China and some other regions such as the Middle East (in line with previous modeling 
studies14,37,62–64). The opposite would hold for India (and Africa, not shown), because of its low per 
capita emissions. The equal-cost burden-sharing scheme in which all regions pay the same price in 
terms of GDP reduction would require a stronger commitment from the OECD (close to 100% 
reduction) and an average 50% reduction for China, while allowing India an increase (as with the 
equal per capita regime). The most drastic change across the schemes would be for the Middle East: 
under an equal-cost scheme, it receives a much larger emission allocation to compensate for its 
higher mitigation costs, which would in part result from worse terms of trade for its fossil-fuel 
exports65.  
Figure 4 here 
 
Economic and financial implications 
A key consideration in climate policy is how to distribute the economic effort of GHG mitigation. Even 
if global mitigation costs were low, policymakers care and argue about the regional distribution of 
policy costs, since it impacts economic development, competitiveness and even political stability. The 
scenarios indicate that the costs of mitigation will vary significantly across countries1,14,66–71. Figure 5 
portrays this finding for the LIMITS models, showing that –in a cost effective framework with uniform 
carbon pricing but without carbon trading and compensatory transfers- mitigation costs in the OECD 
would be lower than global average, and the opposite would hold for developing economies, and 
especially for energy exporting regions, which would face adverse terms of trade effects1,37,71–73. This 
ranking is rather robust across climate targets, mitigation cost metrics and IAMs14,74, though the 
ranges are considerably larger for developing economies.  
Figure 5 here 
The regressivity of regional costs can be attributed to several factors, but especially to emission 
intensity, abatement potential and international trade effects14,75–77. Using data from the EMF22 
model comparison study, a higher ratio of emissions to GDP – the so called emission intensity- in the 
BAU has been shown to lead to lower marginal abatement costs but to higher total costs for a 
common carbon price75. Given the higher current and projected emission intensities of developing 
countries39, these regions will have higher total mitigation costs unless their abatement costs are 
significantly lower. Benefits from reduced warming and from other environmental issues such as local 
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air pollution are likely to significantly affect the distribution of costs, but are not accounted for in this 
calculation. 
The inter-regional distributional tensions highlighted in Figure 5 can be alleviated through emission 
endowments and trading. However, when the carbon budget is tight, as it is the case in 2°C policies, 
even resource sharing schemes such as those based on per capita equalization would not compensate 
for the inequality in favor of OECD countries14,78. A particular challenge lies in the uncertainty about 
the relations between regional emission allocation and costs, which is much greater than the 
uncertainty in global mitigation costs. This uncertainty is likely a key barrier to the implementation of 
an emissions trading scheme with national caps based on a long-term burden sharing scheme. Rather, 
a pragmatic approach featuring various flexible mechanisms and a regular review of emission 
reduction and finance commitments seems more plausible15.  
In addition to macro-economic costs, an important question for policy is how to ensure investment 
flows. This relates to redirecting investments from the fossil fuel industries to sectors involved in low 
carbon energy technologies and energy efficiency, and to ensure mitigation action in the different 
regions worldwide. Some studies have quantified the investment gaps to achieve climate 
stabilization55,79,80,81, and found that a considerable reallocation of investment is required. As shown 
in Figure 6, investments in the fossil fuel extraction sector would be greatly reduced. This 
compensates to a large extent for the additional investment needs in low-carbon energy (renewables, 
nuclear, bioenergy). Additional investment would be needed to improve energy efficiency, the 
transmission and distribution grid and the transition to low-carbon technologies in other sectors such 
as transport. The LIMITS results show, for example, that investments in freely emitting fossil-power 
technologies remain substantial in the pledge scenarios, while they drop in the 450 ppm-eq 
stabilization case. In particular, pledges would be insufficient to reduce investment in coal-fired 
power plants. But if the world credibly embarks on a path towards 450 ppm-eq stabilization, investors 
would largely shun further investment in coal plants, as shown in Figure S5. 
Most of the investments would have to be made in developing countries where the largest absolute 
mitigation effort would take place. According to the model calculations, the global investment gap for 
transitioning from a pledge policy to one fully compatible with 2°C would require filling a global 
investment gap of about half a trillion USD per year for the next 40 years, two thirds of which in the 
developing economies. The gap would be even larger if the counterfactual scenario did not involve 
emission reduction pledges. In addition, investments in clean energy R&D would also need to be 
significantly scaled up, in order to prompt sufficient innovation in new technologies. Models estimate 
these to be about 50-100 USD Billion/year 82–86 over the first half of this century. 
Figure 6 here 
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The current level of green energy investments, estimated at roughly 250 USD billion in 2013 by 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance, falls significantly short of filling this gap. How can the rest be raised? 
Several opportunities exist. Removing energy subsidies would free up resources of the same order of 
magnitude as the gaps87,88. Moreover, all models find that climate policies could provide sufficient 
fiscal revenues within each region to finance the totality of investment in energy supply, while also 
providing incentives to the private sector to raise finance89. Climate finance can assist developing 
economies in filling the investment gap and in alleviating the distributional inequalities. It is worth 
noting that the financing gap is not large relative to the increases in investment rates seen in several 
major emerging-market economies, including China and India, over recent years. Such countries have 
the capacity if necessary to utilize domestic saving, although the question of whether this would be 
equitable would remain.89 
Figure 6 suggests that revenues from the international sales of CO2 permits could cover almost half of 
the investment gap of developing economies, provided industrialized countries committed to such 
transfers. However, in order to work, a large and well-functioning carbon market would need to be 
established in the next 20 years, capable of handling permits for several GtCO2-eq and hundred of 
billions of U.S. dollars of trades per year14,67,70. Such an emission market would be an order of 
magnitude larger than the one currently supporting the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
would require strong institutional support. The latter represent the type of barriers that are not 
analysed by IAMs. The experience with CDM has already highlighted implementation difficulties at a 
much lower level of ambition90.  
Finally, IAM scenarios indicate that climate policies are likely to affect other objectives of policy-
makers; not all of these impacts are monetized in the models’ cost calculations. For example, climate 
policies would lead to reduced energy imports and increased energy independence in some major 
economies such as China, India and the E.U.. This would not be the case for the USA and current 
energy  exporters91. Climate policies could also lead to more resilient energy systems in terms of 
diversity of energy options, preservation of fossil resource ‘buffers’ and decreased sensitivity to GDP 
fluctuations65,92. Transformation pathways spurred by climate policies would also foster air pollution 
control93,94, with particular benefits for China and India95,96. Although the magnitude of co-benefits 
related to air quality is uncertain97, their current importance in major economies such as China could 
lend support to post-2020 climate policies. 
Modeling input to the Durban negotiation process 
The challenge of achieving a comprehensive agreement to reduce emissions is often portrayed as 
either insurmountable or simply a matter of lack of sufficient political will. Rigorous analysis of the 
implications of implementing mitigation measures can help characterizing the subtleties of this 
challenge, supporting a differentiated view on the future of global climate policy and providing useful 
insights for policy design and on the negotiation process. Such an analysis needs to focus on all the 
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key emitting regions and account for the uncertainties characterizing emission reduction 
opportunities.  
In this article, we show that scenarios generated by energy-economy-climate models via a model 
inter-comparison project can help in this task, providing critical information to the ongoing policy 
debate on a post-2020 climate agreement. The use of multiple models (MIPs) can help ensuring that 
key uncertainties are taken into account by using a diversity of different models and model 
assumptions. Reviewing a recent MIP focused at international climate policy in the context of broader 
literature, we relate short and long terms climate objective to key regional indicators such as peaking 
of emissions, carbon budgets and abatement potentials. Our analysis highlights the major challenges 
in sharing the economic effort associated with reducing emissions equitably, while showing the 
importance of regional cooperation towards climate stabilization. The importance and limitation of 
markets is highlighted. Global carbon markets can alleviate some –but not necessarily all- of the 
distributional tensions in climate change mitigation. They can also provide much needed revenues for 
filling investment gaps in clean energy, and if possible achieving other societal goals. But additional 
policy instruments will be needed to achieve the technological and behavioral transformations to 
achieve climate stabilization. 
The currently discussed targets –including those announced in China, EU and the US- are important 
steps forward; our analysis indicate that additional and more comprehensive efforts would be needed 
if we hope to keep temperature from exceeding critical thresholds. Still, expanding and strengthening 
climate cooperation while aligning national interests is by no means straightforward. The numerical 
estimates by the MIPs reviewed in this article highlight some critical areas of the climate policy 
process, which include the regional diversity of mitigation opportunities and costs, the institutional 
requirements for carbon markets, the best use of climate revenues, the linkages with national policy 
priorities, the relevance of technology innovation and diffusion. Progress in all these key areas will be 
needed to motivate enhanced national ambition in reducing emissions in the next decades. 
This review has assessed mitigation challenges and opportunities without considering the regional 
benefits of reducing GHG emissions, mostly because a robust quantification of the latter is not yet 
available in the literature. Similarly, some potential additional strategies for dealing with climate 
change, such as short term lived gases, adaptation and geo-engineering, have not been considered in 
these model exercises. Hopefully these topics will also be examined in the near future, using similar 
common protocols and availing of a large number of integrated assessment models. 
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Figure Captions 
Fig. 1: Emission peaking Time. Year of regional maximum emissions (Kyoto gases; markers show 
median across models and lines 10th-90th percentile ranges). “2100” denotes an increasing emissions 
trajectory throughout the 21st century until the end of the time horizon of the models. Model time step 
is typically 5 to 10 years. Full set of results by model is available in Figure S1. 
Fig. 2. Regional carbon budgets. Cumulative CO2 emissions for the period 2010-2100 (bars show 
median across models and lines 10th-90th percentile ranges. Negative values are possible via negative 
emission technologies). Historical emissions are for the period 1751-2010 (source CDIAC). The shaded 
area show the World carbon budget range for 450 and 500 ppm-eq policies, median across models. 
Regional Kyoto budgets and full set of model results are available in Figures S2 and S3 respectively.  
Fig. 3. Sectoral mitigation. Share of cumulative mitigation (2010-2050) of Kyoto gases across sectors 
for the 450 ppm-eq policy (bars show median across models and lines 10th-90th percentile ranges. 
Negative values show cases where sectoral emissions are higher in the policy scenario than in the 
baseline). The numbers to the right of each bar indicate the regional mitigation potential measured by 
median cumulative (2010-2050) emission reductions (%) from the No Policies scenario (median across 
models). Full set of model results is available in FigureS4. 
Fig. 4. Emission targets. Actual emissions (left panel) and emissions allowances (center and right 
panels), in % reductions in 2050 from 2010 and for a 450 ppm-eq target. The two panels on the right 
show examples of allocation schemes with resource sharing (convergence to equal per capita rights by 
2050) and effort sharing (equalization of relative mitigation costs) respectively. Full permit trading is 
allowed (leading to the cost-minimizing distribution of abatement activity across regions).  
Fig. 5. Distribution of mitigation costs. Relative mitigation costs (e.g. % points reduction in GDP) in 
each region divided by global mitigation costs (again in % points reduction of GDP),  for 450 ppm-eq 
without carbon trading and transfers. The line at 100 indicates the case in which all regions would face 
the relative policy costs, as in the ‘equal cost’ burden sharing scheme case. GDP is discounted over the 
period 2010-2100 at 5%. 
Fig. 6: Investments. Additional annual investment in USD billion/yr (average over the period 2010-
2050; no discounting) between the 450 ppm-eq case and the pledge case, for different sectors and two 
regional groups. The last two columns (shaded) report trade of CO2 permits (positive=selling) for the 
two burden-sharing schemes discussed above. The vertical axis is truncated at +/- 500 USD Billions. 
  
16 
 
 
Boxes 
Box 1. International climate policy through the lens of IAMs 
International climate policy involves complicated negotiations among different parties over a wide 
range of activities. As international climate agreements are voluntary, they need to be self-enforcing. 
The formation of such deals can be studied by model-based analysis of the incentives for joining or 
leaving these agreements. This has led to a specific strand of literature based on game theory and 
strategic interaction21–26, which includes IAM applications27–31 32. More often, though, the formation 
mechanism of the policy agreement is taken as given. Models explore the implications of regional or 
global policies, comparing them, for instance, with a counterfactual world in which such policies are 
absent.  
The LIMITS MIP can be used to illustrate how this is done in practice. A set of scenarios are 
implemented in the six participating models (GCAM,IMAGE,MESSAGE,REMIND,TIAM-ECN,WITCH). 
These include 1) the extent and date of implementation of climate and energy policies, 2) the 
stringency of the regional emission pledges, 3) the long-term climate objective, and 4) the way the 
climate policy burden is shared across regions (see the Table S2 for the scenario description). First of 
all, a counterfactual scenario with no climate policies is built (‘No Policies’). Second, the study 
analysed a reference case representing the current situation of regionally fragmented mitigation 
efforts, based on extrapolation of the strengthened Copenhagen pledges throughout the whole 
century (‘Pledges’, see Table S3 for their exact definition).  In addition, a successful outcome of the 
Durban Platform negotiations was modeled by global cooperation after 2020 on either a long-term 
CO2 concentration objective of 450 ppm-eq or 500 ppm-eq. Given the uncertainty surrounding 
climate change, each of these concentration levels produces a probability distribution of temperature 
outcomes. By using the MAGICC climate model, 450 and 500 ppm-eq targets were found to 
correspond to a likely (>66%) and as-likely-as-not (>50%) chance of achieving 2°C respectively.  
The stabilization scenarios are implemented in a cost effective way, with emissions reduced where it 
is cheapest to do so. Different burden-sharing regimes across regions have been considered, to allow 
regions to be compensated for their emission reductions. Thus, in addition to the case of globally 
harmonized carbon tax (without allowing for transfers between regions, e.g., via the trade of emission 
permits), we considered the assignment of emissions permits based on either convergence to equal 
per capita emissions or equalization of mitigation costs across regions, in terms of percentage points 
of GDP reductions. 
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